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In January 1966, John Kelly was the victim of a hit-and-run accident
that left him disabled. He began receiving Home Relief, a form of public
assistance administered by the State and City of New York in August of
the following year. Mr. Kelly then resided at the Broadway Central Ho-
tel, but in December his public assistance caseworker directed him to
move to the Barbara Hotel. With misgivings, Mr. Kelly did so, but subse-
quently left the Barbara because he feared being victimized by drunks and
drug addicts. He moved into a friend's apartment. On January 8, 1968,
Mr. Kelly learned that his caseworker had determined that he was no
longer eligible for public assistance, apparently because he had violated
his caseworker's direction to reside at the Barbara Hotel. On January 8
and again on January 16, Mr. Kelly sought an explanation from his
caseworker at the Gramercy Welfare Center in New York City. Both
times his caseworker refused an interview. Prevented from working by his
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disability, and now without any source of income, Mr. Kelly relied on the
charity of friends to survive. He also brought a lawsuit challenging the
legality of his termination.
That lawsuit, Goldberg v. Kelly,' reached the Supreme Court, which
held that the State had violated Mr. Kelly's procedural due process rights.
The Court's opinion broadly defined "property" rights protected by the
due process clause to include government entitlements, and ruled that
when the government sought to deprive Mr. Kelly of such property rights,
due process required a prior hearing at which he might personally con-
front the evidence against him. Although later decisions have narrowed
the sweep of Goldberg's reasoning,2 it remains a much-discussed decision
in the fields of constitutional and administrative law. Oddly, civil proce-
dure teachers in the 1970s pretty much ignored the case.3
Except for Professors Robert Cover and Owen Fiss. They used
Goldberg v. Kelly as the focal point for their fall 1974 course in Civil
Procedure at the Yale Law School." Around this case they assembled a set
of badly xeroxed teaching materials exploring the values served by proce-
dure and the structures underlying it. The materials included hundreds of
pages of procedural due process opinions and articles about them, rele-
gated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to a secondary role and ex-
cluded altogether such pedagogical chestnuts as Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,'
Pennoyer v. Neff,' and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.7 While the materials
and the instruction did not ignore procedural rules and their interaction,
the focus was larger. Why is procedure important (if at all)? What does
fairness mean? Can procedural rules encourage better substantive results?
And so on. Because the materials looked beyond the four corners of proce-
dural doctrine, Fiss' fall 1975 class dubbed the course "Metaprocedure." 8
Fiss and Cover worked on the materials for more than a decade, and
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). My account of Mr. Kelly's case is taken from his complaint, whose
factual allegations were not denied in the litigation.
2. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
3. Goldberg is not reprinted, excerpted, cited or mentioned in any of the leading civil procedure
casebooks published since 1970. (Caveat: J. CHADBOURN, L. LEVINE & P. SCHUCHMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1974), includes Supreme Court decisions citing Goldberg,
but has no independent citation.)
4. See Fiss, Tribute to Robert M. Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1717 (1987). I understand that Professor
Abram Chayes of the Harvard Law School, and perhaps other procedure teachers, also used Goldberg
in their courses in the 1970s.
5. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. 1 was a student in that class. Richard Cornish was the first person to use the term (to my
knowledge), and we all adopted it immediately, as did the amused instructor when he got wind of it.
Fiss now says that we devised the term for the course "to distinguish it from real procedure," Fiss,
supra note 4, at 1717, but my recollection is that a good many (I think most) of us thought that his
course was "real procedure," the commonsensical approach to the topic, and that the courses starting
with Pennoyer v. Neff or Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. were strange.
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Professor Judith Resnik joined the team in the early 1980s. The product
of their collaboration is the most important procedure casebook, and one
of the most important procedure books, in thirty-five years. Cover, Fiss
and Resnik's Procedure is an intellectual Mardi Gras-a joyous, outra-
geous, intense feast of ideas that seeks to revolutionize the subject.9 Em-
phasizing the intellectual and socio-political structures of procedure rather
than its nuts and bolts, Cover, Fiss and Resnik propound a radically new
way of teaching procedure to students. This, in turn, entails new ways of
thinking about the value of procedure. The casebook is an important syn-
thesis of the authors' view of adjudication as a public event rather than
simply a means of resolving private disputes. It is a key contribution to
the emerging jurisprudence of the post-legal process era. This review will
explore the implications and limitations of metaprocedure as a way of
thinking about pedagogy, adjudication, and law.
I. THE PEDAGOGY OF PROCEDURE: FROM PHASES OF A LAWSUIT TO
METAPROCEDURE
Procedure offers a revolutionary approach to the teaching of that sub-
ject to first-year students. The authors' approach may be understood as an
alternative to, and an evolution beyond, the traditional pedagogy embodied
in Materials for a Basic Course in Civil Procedure, a casebook published
in 1953 by Professors Richard Field and Benjamin Kaplan.'0 The Field
and Kaplan book was itself a seminal modern effort to provide a coherent
intellectual structure for the first-year procedure course," and it has been
a great success. Not only has it gone through five editions (Professor Ke-
vin Clermont was added as a co-author beginning with the fourth), but it
has set the tone and agenda in procedure casebooks for an entire genera-
tion. 2 All but one of the procedure casebooks available in the 1980s are
structurally similar to Field, Kaplan and Clermont.' 3
Three closely interrelated ideas are prominent in the Field and Kaplan
pedagogy of procedure. First, the book and the instruction were organized
9. The authors' agenda is not stated explicitly in the casebook, and the arguments I draw from the
book are in some degree speculative, or at least my own interpretation. That interpretation is in-
formed, however, by the authors' general writings on the subject, which are collected and synthesized
in Procedure.
10. R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1953).
11. Field and Kaplan were the first to organize a casebook around the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and thereby to provide a coherent framework of rules to discuss procedural issues. For
leading casebooks before Field and Kaplan, see P. HAYS, CASES & MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCE-
DURE (1947); A. SCOTT & S. SIMPSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1950).
12. See J. CHADBOURN & A. LEVIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1961); J.
COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (1968) (dedi-
cated to Field and Kaplan); D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING
AND PROCEDURE-STATE AND FEDERAL (1962).
13. The one exception, in my view, is P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (3d ed. 1983).
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around the "Phases of a Lawsuit." '14 Like earlier casebooks, Field and
Kaplan focused on the nuts and bolts of procedural doctrine and arranged
the doctrinal materials (rules and appellate decisions) in roughly the order
in which they would be implicated in a lawsuit. Unlike earlier casebooks,
Field & Kaplan sought to bring greater intellectual coherence, even ele-
gance, to the study of procedure by concentrating on a "single, modern
system of procedure," namely, the Federal Rules. 5 This was their second
organizing principle. Indeed, Field and Kaplan contrasted the reformist
policy of the Federal Rules with their common law and code antecedents,
subtly suggesting a whiggish view that we had progressed to a grand set of
"rules of more or less general application."'" Their book is suffused with
the notion that the Federal Rules represent some kind of apotheosis of
procedure. Nonetheless, Field and Kaplan did not abandon a critical
stance, though their critique is an internal one and focuses on the margins
(the core is fine). Thus, their third central idea is that the rules and doc-
trine must be constantly reexamined and improved, so that they work bet-
ter to subserve the dispute-resolution goals of procedure. 17
Field and Kaplan's three pedagogical ideas have dominated the teaching
of first-year procedure for the last thirty-five years. Developments in legal
theory and education have undermined the cogency of these ideas, how-
ever, and have paved the way for new approaches to teaching procedure.
One significant development has been the establishment of clinical pro-
grams at most law schools. Clinical education has demonstrated that real
case studies-such as the Buffalo Creek litigation"-are better tools than
appellate decisions for teaching the doctrine and mechanics of procedure.
Using vivid and detailed stories of what happened in a dramatic litigation
and providing students with copies of the actual litigation documents, case
studies stimulate student interest in procedure and form the basis for en-
joyable and demanding drafting and simulation assignments." These
outside assignments can be used in a procedure course to teach basic doc-
trine-the phases of a real, ongoing lawsuit-freeing up class time to dis-
cuss larger conceptual issues.20
14. Field and Kaplan's first chapter is entitled "Phases of a Lawsuit," a 150 page gallop through
a typical civil lawsuit. The remainder of the book is a more leisurely doctrinal survey of the issues
raised in this initial chapter. R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, supra note 10.
15. Id. at ix.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at x (instruction should instill in students a "feeling of personal responsibility for the fair
and efficient running of procedural machinery").
18. Its story is told in G. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976). Professors Lawrence
Grosberg, James Flanagan and others have developed materials, a book of litigation documents, and
videotapes that can be used by teachers to integrate the litigation into their teaching of doctrine
(pleading and discovery especially).
19. A former clinical studies professor, Resnik has developed drafting and simulation exercises to
use in conjunction with the Cover, Fiss and Resnik book. Fiss has developed a computer game (The
Coney Island Game) that teaches discovery rules in a rigorous and wonderful way.
20. The existence of clinical programs may also make it less necessary for first-year procedure to
[Vol. 98: 945
Metaprocedure
Another important development, the increased reliance on extra-legal
arguments in legal scholarship, offers procedure teachers more intellectual
options for exploring these larger issues. Law is no longer considered the
"autonomous discipline" it was when Field and Kaplan were writing.21
For example, if one posits that fairness and efficiency are the goals of
procedure,22 modern scholars would be inclined to consult the impressive
body of pertinent extra-legal scholarship bearing on those goals, including
philosophy and ethics, psychology, economics, and social and political the-
ory.23 The greatest strength of Field and Kaplan-its tight internal rigor
and comprehensive analysis of legal doctrine-has become a weakness.
Finally, we have lost Field and Kaplan's satisfaction with the Federal
Rules. This "failing faith" is due not only to an accumulation of examples
where the Rules do not work very well, but also to a sense that there are
structural reasons why they will never completely succeed.24 Many proce-
dure scholars now share the view that we cannot understand the Rules
without understanding their interrelationship with structures of social and
economic oppression, human psychology, and economic incentives. Fur-
thermore, we believe that procedural rules ought not always be transsub-
stantive, but that they must be tailored to different types of litigation.
With their pride in the grand generality of procedural rules, Field and
Kaplan are now often irrelevant to the cutting edge issues in procedure.
Talk of reforming Rules and doctrine is no longer confined to marginal
matters, and scholars are openly relying on vastly different mod-
els-including the civil law inquisitorial approach and communitarian ap-
proaches-to urge more fundamental reshaping of civil procedure.25
emphasize the doctrinal mechanics of litigation by providing an alternate means for students interested
in litigation to pick up those skills. On the other hand, professors in clinical programs appreciate, and
may expect, first-year procedure to give students at least some initial nuts-and-bolts training.
21. See Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-87, 100 HARV. L. REV.
761 (1987).
22. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 1; R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 4.
23. For some especially notable examples of such interdisciplinary borrowing, see Clermont, Pro-
cedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CONN. L. REV.
1115 (1987) (psychology); Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HRAiV. L. REV. 637 (1976) (sociology); Felstiner, Influences of Social Organi-
zation on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 63 (1974) (organization theory); Posner, Economic
Approaches to Legal Procedure &Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUn. 399 (1973) (econom-
ics); Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982) (economics); Simon, The Ideology of Advo-
cacy, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29 (philosophy); Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 541 (1978) (social science); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1329 (1971) (probability theory); Winter, The Metaphor of Standing
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1987) (cognitive and language theory).
24. See, e.g., Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975) (excerpted pp. 1814-24); Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974)
(excerpted pp. 660-73); Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CH. L.
REV. 494 (1986) (excerpted pp. 941-49).
25. See, e.g., Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparitive Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE
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These developments in legal education have made procedure teachers
increasingly restive with the Field and Kaplan approach, and we have
responded by opening up the first-year procedure course to simulations
and case studies, discussions of constitutional due process, and law review
articles bringing the insights of anthropology, feminist theory, critical le-
gal studies, economics, and human psychology to bear on issues of proce-
dure. 6 Cover, Fiss and Resnik have drawn from these responses and have
created a casebook for the procedure teacher whose failing faith extends to
the Field and Kaplan approach. The pedagogical decisions made by the
authors radically depart from the traditional teaching strategy for civil
procedure.
The most important decision is to focus on themes and structures of
procedure, rather than the history and mechanics of doctrine. The authors
made a conscious decision not to organize the material linearly; they do
not march the student through the phases of a lawsuit.2" Instead, the
book's seven chapters explore larger conceptual themes: the value of pro-
cedure; the nature of adjudication, and different paradigms of what we
might consider "typical" adjudication; the ways in which different people
and institutions are treated when they are parties in an adjudication; the
opportunites and incentives for strategic behavior by parties in a lawsuit,
and ways to deal with it; the process of decisionmaking and its uneasy
relationship to rationality; the sources of judicial power and the rationales
for the apportionment and sharing of that power among federal and state
courts in our federal system; and the reasons why we may forego proce-
dure. While the major doctrinal issues are in the book, somewhere,2" they
do not dictate the flow of the book and are not covered in great detail.
Additionally, the authors do not give the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure the deferential, if not canonical, treatment they are accorded in tradi-
tional casebooks. Procedure subjects the assumptions of the Federal Rules
to skeptical analysis. An essay at the end of the book, playfully titled "Ap-
pendix: On Reading the Rules," is a probing critique of the way the Fed-
eral Rules are made and of their pretension to transsubstantive applica-
L.J. 480 (1978); Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. OHi. L. REv. 823
(1985) (excerpted pp. 950-59); Leigh-Wai Doo, Dispute Settlement in Chinese-American Communi-
ties, 21 AM. J. CoMp. L. 627 (1973) (excerpted pp. 1373-82); Resnik, supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., R. CovER & 0. Fiss, THE STrRuCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979) (collection of law
review articles to supplement procedure casebooks).
27. "Our twin goals are to provide appreciation of and insight into both the theory and practice of
procedure-insights often obscured by a linear organization and by the reading of appellate opinions."
P. xi.
28. See pp. 1-8 (overview of phases of a lawsuit and applicable Federal Rules), 61-99 (complaint,
preliminary relief), 478-537 (class actions), 612-30 (ancillary and pendent jurisdiction), 826-59 &
895-940 (discovery), 1101-16 (evidence), 1134-45 (failure to state a claim, summary judgment),
1185-90 & 1207-24 (jury trial), 1434-61 (personal jurisdiction), 1474-89 (Erie), 1550-54 (appellate
review), 1568-69 (directed verdict, judgment n.o.v.), 1684-87 (res judicata, collateral estoppel),
1787-94 & 1810-14 (Rules Enabling Act).
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tion.2" Indeed, the book is not at all limited to civil procedure. Although
civil issues receive the greatest attention, the authors complement them
with comparisons to rules of criminal and administrative procedure.80 At
many points where the Federal Rules are applicable, the authors invite
the student to understand that there are alternative ways of regulating the
procedural issue at hand-with reference to administrative or criminal
procedures, to the procedures followed by different cultures, or to some
hypothetical procedural structure suggested by extra-legal theory. The
perspective of the book is relentlessly inquiring and reformist.
The focus on structures of procedure and the reformist stance are neces-
sarily accompanied by the further decision to rely much less on appellate
decisions than has any previous casebook in procedure, and much more
heavily upon case studies, excerpts from transcripts, and articles,3 ' not to
mention the marvelously apt illustrations that dot the book. 2 This deci-
sion opens up the course beyond doctrine and provides students materials
which can be used to question doctrine and to discuss the big themes
around which the book is organized. It also makes available to students
vivid and multifaceted materials that can enrich class discussion.
An overview does not begin to capture the intellectual excitement of the
Cover, Fiss and Resnik pedagogy. The best feature of the pedagogy is its
insistence that teachers and students think through the big issues of proce-
dure. This is apparent in the first chapter, which uses Goldberg v. Kelly
as a way of analyzing "the value of procedure." Why should the govern-
ment have to provide Mr. Kelly with a hearing before it takes away his
welfare benefits? Given the facts of the case, surely one reason is to avoid
erroneous decisions, since the deprivation in that case was abrupt and
questionable. A prior hearing for Mr. Kelly probably would have pre-
vented a needless and terribly hurtful government action. But, as dissent-
ing opinions argued, how can we be certain that a prior hearing for all
the Mr. Kellys will not increase the overall error rate by allowing "unde-
serving" recipients to remain on the welfare rolls? Although the Court did
not discuss this argument, its response probably would have been that due
29. Pp. 1787-1824.
30. "Because the issues central to procedure-the values to be implemented, the remedial capaci-
ties of courts, the permissible range of party structure, the relationship among decisionmaking cen-
ters-are common to all kinds of litigation, we have not limited our concerns to a single context, be it
civil, criminal or administrative." P. vii.
31. "We have also departed from the often exclusive reliance, typical of many casebooks, upon
court (usually appellate court) opinions. In our view, these pedagogic methods fail to capture both the
complex theoretical problems of procedure and the fascinating dynamics of litigation." P. xi.
32. Not to be missed: Sir Joshua Reynolds'Justice (p. ii); a photograph of the Hotel Granada (p.
80) accompanying the Goldberg materials; a view of Mark Twain Junior High School (p. 269) and
of Judge Weinstein (p. 274), the two central figures in the Coney Island Desegregation Litigation; my
favorite, Gary Gilmore's haunting self-portrait in a letter to his mother (p. 431); and a photograph of
an American child of Japanese descent, with a military police officer, on his way to a detention camp
in 1942 (p. 1748), a lawless detention upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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process is more than a cost-benefit calculus. Is that response persuasive?"3
What other values might be served?
One other value might be to assure an individual participation in deci-
sions affecting him or her, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the ulti-
mate decision. One might wonder, however, whether an unsophisticated
person without aid of counsel will be able to participate meaningfully. 4
Even so, there may still be a dignitary or empowerment value to the re-
quired procedure. As a society we are concerned about the way we treat
individuals, and we are willing to go the extra procedural mile for the
victimized. The procedures tell the victim that he or she is not powerless,
and remind the bureaucrat of the human gravity of his or her decisions.
But a hearing where Mr. Kelly is marginalized by petty bureaucrats may
not serve this value. Ultimately, one might conclude that any value for
procedure is contingent upon the social and economic context. It may be
that the most we can say about giving Mr. Kelly more procedural protec-
tion is that it ought to be part of a duster of social reforms seeking to
empower those in Mr. Kelly's position. 5
Such discussions are pedagogically fundamental. If law school is to be
more than a trade school, and is to provide our students with intellectual
challenge and vision, we law professors ought to raise meta-questions
about the values of procedure. When better to raise them than at the very
beginning of the students' education? 8 And what better vehicle than
Goldberg v. Kelly? 7 The facts of the case are dramatic, and likely to
engage students intellectually. A case evaluating constitutional arguments,
Goldberg is particularly self-conscious about the value choices it is mak-
ing, and about the constitutive significance of those choices. As the first
case in a line of decisions which explore the reach and limits of procedural
due process, Goldberg helps students to see how the law develops from
case to case, and how changing political values affect that process. 3 If we
as procedure teachers want to make our subject one that engages students
and demands intellectual effort from them, chapter one of the Cover, Fiss
and Resnik casebook is a terrific start.
The riposte to this aspiration, of course, is that before the students can
fly with the metaproceduralists, they must learn to walk with the nuts and
bolters. The authors are not insensitive to this problem. Their solution is
33. The book develops this theme through analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
which reinterpreted Goldberg as a cost-benefit case. See pp. 112-32.
34. See pp. 134-57, reproducing and analyzing Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S.
18 (1981).
35. Pp. 132-34.
36. It is widely accepted that students at most law schools are less engaged by their classes (i.e.,
don't do the reading) after the first year. Hence, the intellectual agenda of the first year is critical, if
we expect to have an intellectual impact on most of our students.
37. I actually prefer Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), reprinted pp.
134-55.
38. See supra note 2 (cases narrowing Goldberg).
[Vol. 98: 945
Metaprocedure
to provide ample factual detail and to build doctrine as well as theory
around those facts. Therefore, chapter one contains copious excerpts from
the litigation documents in Goldberg v. Kelly, including the complaint and
applications for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
(and affidavits). 9 The materials at once show the students what docu-
ments they might be expected to draft in litigation, and enrich the discus-
sion of the Court's decision by giving students a more detailed version of
the facts and procedural background. 0 In short, metaprocedure does not
mean that the teacher must neglect doctrine, only that doctrine need not
monopolize class time.
Every chapter is like the first, starting with an interesting and factually
rich case study41 and using the case study as an introduction to a cluster of
doctrines and structural themes. In this way, the book is one intellectual
feast after another. While these merits make Procedure essential reading
for every teacher of the subject, it is not so clear that many will adopt the
book for instruction of first-year students (parts of the book would work
well in an advanced seminar on metaprocedure). Most procedure teachers
using the traditional approach are relatively happy with it and will be
reluctant to throw over a fairly successful approach for something so dif-
ferent. 2 And so risky. Metaprocedure can be the best intellectual experi-
ence a law student can have, but it can also engender complaints and
dissatisfaction on the part of students who have a rulebook mentality.
Also, alas, there are a few pedagogical problems with Procedure even
on its own terms. It is quite long, and somewhat underedited. 4'3 Weighing
in at 1824 pages of text (almost a record), the book is impossible to cover
in a year-long course, much less the truncated semester-long procedure
course taught at many law schools." The sheer length of the excerpts and
39. Pp. 53-104.
40. My description of Mr. Kelly's plight, text preceding note 1, was taken from the Goldberg
complaint, reproduced pp. 61-72.
41. For example, chapter three, on parties, starts with the Supreme Court's decision not to allow
the ACLU and Bessie Gilmore to present arguments to the Court concerning the execution of her son,
Gary (pp, 429-46). In a dramatic touch, the book reproduces, in the original handwritten form, the
correspondence between Gary Gilmore and the civil libertarians seeking to prevent his execution,
which is more eloquent than a thousand pages of legal briefs (pp. 429-37). Chapter two, on the forms
of adjudication, concentrates on the Coney Island school desegregation litigation (pp. 227-351). This
is an excellent case study, because it reveals the promise and the frustrations of such institutional
litigation.
42. On the other hand, many teachers have already abandoned the traditional approach and have
developed their own materials. The best example is the "Creekie Movement," a veritable sect of
procedure teachers who integrate the story of the Buffalo Creek disaster litigation into the courses.
Apart from using counsel's story of the case, G. STERN, supra note 18, teachers use the Creek litiga-
tion documents, videotape simulation exercises (such as mock Creek depositions), and movies about
the community in the wake of the disaster. The Creek materials can themselves be a way of doing
metaprocedure.
43. Many of the articles and case studies could have used more editing and editorial summary.
The biggest editing mistake, in my view, is reproducing 57 pages of the plaintiff's closing argument in
Silkwood (pp. 990-1047). It is painfully boring.
44. The authors, I hope with tongue-in-cheek, say that "[a] year is needed to complete the book;
in semester courses selections from the chapters enable consideration of all the central issues of proce-
19891
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the nonsequential coverage of doctrine pose a risk of confusing first-year
students and overloading them with information. 45 The problem of length
and underediting may be ameliorated, because the instructor can edit out
things he or she does not find useful and can lecture to fill in doctrinal
gaps.
A more fundamental problem is the book's anti-historicism. Its focus on
the "here and now" and its neglect of background and evolution are strik-
ing. Almost everything excerpted in the book-cases, articles, even stat-
utes-is recent, post-dating Goldberg v. Kelly. The authors snub such
useful historical materials as the history of pleading, the evolution of law
and equity,46 and the background of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
The book boils down into capsule summaries the historical twists and
turns of the Erie and personal jurisdiction cases.4" This apparent anti-
historicism is troubling, because the evolution of rules and doctrine is es-
sential to understanding them, and even to reforming them. Legal reason-
ing itself is a dynamic interaction between a present controversy and his-
torical texts (statutes, cases, rules),48 and students lose this rich tradition if
argument is limited to current justifications for doctrine.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the pedagogy of
metaprocedure-with a focus on the structures of procedure, a globally
rationalist and reformist perspective, and liberal use of comparative and
extra-legal materials-will and ought to have a central role in first-year
procedure courses. There are many ways to do this without giving up the
advantages of a more historical and doctrinal coverage. Assuming a year-
long course, I have found that a most successful agenda is one that draws
from the strengths of traditional procedure, with its emphasis on history
and step-by-step development of doctrine, and of metaprocedure, with its
intellectual excitement and reformist vision, and of clinical procedure,
with its practical focus on a vivid litigation experience. 49 One might begin
with a case study of the Buffalo Creek litigation, which gets the students
excited about procedure and gives them a snapshot of the dynamics of a
dure." P. xi. Given the conceptual difficulty of the material, the care with which the intellectual
debate needs to be developed, and the slow process of teaching first-year students legal reasoning,
these are unrealistic goals for any but the most gifted instructor.
45. For example, the Goldberg litigation materials confront students with issues of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the convening of a three-judge court, requests for class action treatment, and preliminary
and declaratory relief, not to mention the complicated interaction between state and federal welfare
rules. None of these issues is central to the agenda of chapter one, and so none is treated in detail. Yet
students will wonder about them, and the more compulsive students will actually try to figure them
out (often with disastrous results).
46. It is boiled down on p. 191.
47. Pp. 1435-42 (personal jurisdiction from Pennoyer to World-Wide Volkswagen), 1474-89
(Erie to Hanna).
48. For elaboration, see Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479
(1987).
49. This paragraph describes the way I have been teaching first-year procedure for the last six
years, except that I became a Creekie only this year. I believe that something like this approach is a
successful accommodation of the various pedagogical goals discussed in this review.
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civil lawsuit. Once the students have an understanding of what a lawsuit
entails, turn to several introductory issues of metaprocedure, such as the
value of procedure and the requirements of fundamental fairness (chapter
one of the Cover, Fiss and Resnik book). Then go through the phases of a
lawsuit in the order desired, at each point integrating history, Rules and
doctrine, and the meta-issues of fairness and value. Use the Buffalo Creek
litigation as the basis for nuts-and-bolts exercises (drafting a complaint
and answer, conducting discovery, and doing mock settlement negotia-
tions). In the last month of class, return to metaprocedure, this time chal-
lenging the private dispute-resolution view of adjudication assumed in the
Buffalo Creek litigation book and posing as an alternative the Cover, Fiss
and Resnik view of adjudication (chapter two of their book). Their recon-
ceptualization of adjudication is the most exciting intellectual contribution
of the book, and to it I now turn.
II. THE IDEOLOGY OF ADJUDICATION: FROM DISPUTE RESOLUTION
TO PUBLIC VALUES
Oddly enough, for a casebook, Procedure may exercise just as much, if
not more, influence on the scholarship of procedure as on its pedagogy.50
Complementing the book's pedagogy is its reconceptualization of "adjudi-
cation." In summary form, the authors' position is that adjudication is
best viewed not as private dispute resolution, but rather as a process by
which public rights are determined and articulated. This is a fascinating
vision of adjudication, with potentially radical implications for procedural
doctrine.
By their assumptions about typical lawsuits, and the way they approach
doctrine, traditional casebooks have assumed and perpetuated what might
be called the "Hobbesian Paradigm" of adjudication, under which the role
of adjudication is to resolve disputes between isolated litigants.51 The par-
adigm depends on three structural axioms. First, the parties are treated as
discrete individuals, each represented by counsel whose job is zealously to
protect the interests of the client.52 This is the "private rights axiom."
50. For example, chapter five, on decisionmaking and judgment, offers materials on psychological
lecisionmaking that might be used to rethink rules of evidence, burdens of proof, and regulation of
attorney behavior.
51. See, e.g., R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 1 ("the task of courts in civil cases is to
decide specific disputes brought before them by people who cannot or will not settle their controversies
by themselves"); D. LouIsEu. & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, at 1 ("A lawsuit is a process by which
a court resolves a controversy between people over some matter.").
52. "The typical civil case is initiated and carried on by a [private] person who seeks redress for
some wrong alleged to have been committed against him by another." R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, supra
note 10, at 1. Traditional casebooks start with a hypothetical lawsuit that is a simple diversity case
between two individuals, and use that as the anchoring example from which their analysis of the
phases of a lawsuit proceeds. E.g., J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, supra note 12, at
4-18 (Aikens is run over by Beasley but sues Cecil, who owns the car); D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD,
supra note 12, at 1-2 (Smith buys rifle from Jones, and rifle explodes).
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Second, the structure of the adjudication is triadic: counsel for the two (or
more) parties are in an adversarial position and engage in argumentative
combat, with the judge sitting above it all as an umpire.53 This is the
"triadic axiom." Third, at the end of the adversarial contest, the judge (or
a jury) will finally and authoritatively declare the rights and duties of the
parties. Remedies, if awarded, will seek to return the parties to a position
of repose and security.5 4 This "security axiom" grows out of the Hobbes-
ian Paradigm's belief that a central role of government is to limit the
possibilities for disorder.
Traditional casebooks were not uncritical of the Hobbesian Paradigm,
but their critique was typically an understated and marginal one.5 What
Cover, Fiss and Resnik have done in chapter two is to assemble the lead-
ing critiques of the Hobbesian Paradigm (many written by the casebook
authors),5" and to propose an alternative model. Through a case study of
the Coney Island Desegregation Litigation,57 the authors provide evidence
that the axioms of the Hobbesian Paradigm are not universally valid, and
may be inverted.
To begin with, the private rights axiom seems inapplicable to the Co-
ney Island Litigation.5" The parties were groups, not individuals: plain-
53. "A distinctive element of the procedure for resolving legal controversies is the adversary sys-
tem. This element is indeed central to the whole subject, and unless it is understood it becomes well
nigh impossible to explain, much less to justify, most of our procedural law." J. COUND, J.
FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, supra note 12, at 1; see R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at
166-69, reproducing L. Fuller, Problems of Jurisprudence 706-08 (temp. ed. 1949) (judge reacts to
initiatives of the parties and seeks to discover "the most effective and least disruptive" way to resolve
the controversy); D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, at 39-55, 1290-97 (lawsuit is nothing
but a partisan battle to settle a private dispute).
54. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (1965) ("procedure should yield final and lasting adjudi-
cations so that people may enjoy the maximum of repose and security").
55. The 1953 edition of Field and Kaplan, for example, included criticisms of the way the adver-
sary system operated. R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 169-76, 181-83. The 1984 edition
of Field, Kaplan & Clermont has a fair amount of material questioning the generality of the Hobbes-
ian Paradigm, reflecting the growing literature on the subject. R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLER-
MONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 253-66 (5th ed. 1984) (problems with the adversary system); id. at 266-98
(alternatives to the adversary system); id. at 1172-89 (class actions and public litigation). Unhappily,
the authors compress most of the excerpted materials virtually beyond recognition. For example, the
extraordinary and complex Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976) is boiled down to less than a page in the casebook. R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K.
CLERMONT, supra, at 249-50.
56. See Chayes, supra note 55 (excerpted pp. 389-402); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and
the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) (excerpted pp. 403-14);
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1979) [hereinafter Forms ofJustice] (excerpted pp. 383-87); Fiss, The Social and Political Founda-
tions of Adjudication, 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) [hereinafter Foundations of Adjudication]
(excerpted pp. 219-26); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982) (excerpted pp.
415-27).
57. Pp. 227-370.
58. While there is nothing new about litigation that affects large numbers of people, see S.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987), desegre-
gation litigation such as the Coney Island Case has stimulated academics to identify "group" or "pub-
lic rights" as something more than just an aggregation of individual rights. See, e.g., Chayes, The
Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1982).
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tiffs were children attending the Mark Twain Junior High School, which
they alleged was segregated by race; defendants were the Community
School Board of Brooklyn, School District #21 and its members; third-
party defendants were the Mayor of New York and the Chancellor of the
Board of Education of the City of New York. It makes a difference, and
better reflects sociological reality, to see these parties as groups rather
than as a collection of individuals. As groups, the parties litigated not only
for the present membership, but also over the rights and duties of future
members.59 As groups, the parties' interests were not exogenously defined,
since the views and interests of the parties changed as the litigation
progressed."0 As groups, the parties' positions tended to be defined in
terms of public interest, rather than just a congeries of private interests.
The Coney Island Litigation became a struggle among various concep-
tions of what solution to segregation was in the public interest, rather
than just a battle among private interests.
Nor did the triadic axiom hold up in the Coney Island Litigation.
There was some adversarial clash before Judge Weinstein found Mark
Twain to be segregated, but the bulk of the case was devising a remedy
for the segregation, and that phase was not triadic. Different defendants
disagreed with one another as to a proper remedy, and plaintiffs' proposed
remedies were disputed by intervening plaintiff groups. The judge openly
recognized the sprawling nature of the dispute (even specific parties were
not sure of their own positions) and appointed a special master to devise a
plan. The special master talked with everyone involved, and the discus-
sions not only helped him frame his own views, but altered the views of
some of the parties.61 The special master's report itself became the subject
of fierce debate among the parties, and the judge ultimately accepted only
part of it. The triad became the "polycenter, ' '6 2 and public officers (the
judge and the special master) were important participants in the dynamics
of the litigation.
The least valid axiom for the Coney Island Litigation, as for most de-
segregation litigation, was the security axiom. There could be no "return"
to the original state, because the plaintiffs were alleging that it was itself
structurally illegal. Nor did the remedy promise repose or security for the
litigants, since plaintiffs were seeking a structural injunction that would
59. If desegregation of Mark Twain were ordered, its main benefit would inure to future students
there, not the present ones, and the duty to implement such a plan would fall upon future members of
the School Board, not the ones originally sued.
60. The best example is that of the defendant School Board, whose membership started out with
heterogeneous views, and whose collective position and attitude shifted over the course of the lawsuit.
Pp. 333-34.
61. See pp. 310-41 (analysis of the litigation, in retrospect, by the special master).
62. M. PoIANYI, THE LoGic OF LBERTY (1951), introduced the idea of polycentric disputes, in
which resolution requires treatment of several different variables, usually over a period of time.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978), developed the idea as
a limitation on adjudication, which Fiss, Forms ofJustice, supra note 56, at 39-43, sharply criticizes.
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change a lawless context into a just one, and to transform relationships in
a publicly desirable way. For this type of lawsuit, the focus is an ongoing
process of change (the court's order sets structural forces in motion), not a
return to the status quo or the creation of a new repose.
As the Coney Island case study reveals, the Hobbesian Paradigm does
not adequately describe desegregation cases, which fit a new "Brown Par-
adigm" of group rights, judicial involvement in a polycentric dispute, and
ongoing transformation of the status quo. Procedure suggests, further,
that the collapse of the Hobbesian Paradigm extends well beyond desegre-
gation and institutional reform litigation. For example, although one can
analyze Goldberg v. Kelly as a Hobbesian case, it fits the Brown Para-
digm somewhat better.6 3 Even in tort and contract cases the assumptions
of the Hobbesian Paradigm often do not apply. Litigants rarely represent
just themselves or their exogenously defined interests. For example, the
government is the most frequent single litigant, and part of the job of the
government lawyer is to represent the overall public interest, which might
change in response to the litigation." As complex litigation and class ac-
tions have grown more prominent, the interaction among the parties has
become more politically charged, and the need for judicial management
more apparent, especially when there are resource and distributional ine-
qualities among the parties. Even the simplest litigation transforms the
status quo, and probably ought to transform what is often an unfair and
oppressive status quo.
The Cover, Fiss and Resnik materials might be read to suggest, as Fiss
has explicitly argued previously,65 that the general lesson we should draw
from the growing relevance of the Brown Paradigm is that adjudication
should not be viewed as the resolution of disputes, but instead as the pro-
cess by which we develop and articulate "public values." Fiss contends
that the Hobbesian dispute-resolution vision of adjudication is wrongly
indifferent to (constitutional) values that transcend the interests of individ-
uals, ignores the public nature of the judge (a state official and a member
of a coordinate branch of our government), and assumes that the natural
63. While Mr. Kelly certainly had a real private interest in asserting his right to a prior hearing,
he and his co-plaintiffs were essentially asserting the group rights of welfare recipients, not just in
New York but nationwide, and not just present but future recipients. The defendants were public
officials and institutions, and they too represented broader public interests, of other institutions and
future officials. Although the lawyers for the various parties took opposing positions on many issues,
the lawsuit in fact impelled New York to rethink its policies for terminating welfare recipients. The
purpose, and result, of the adjudication was not to return Mr. Kelly to the status quo ante, but to
transform public attitudes and policies toward the marginalized members of our society.
64. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the State changed its position (and its welfare policies) in the course of
the litigation, just as the School Board did in Coney Island. Especially when one party is a govern-
mental entity-an institution with public obligations-the litigant's "interest" may change over time
in response to debate and politics.
65. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 56; Fiss, Foundations of Adjudication, supra note 56.
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state of society is either just or tolerably unjust (hence, making a return to
the status quo desirable). 6
A fascinating application of Fiss' public values thesis relates to the set-
tlement of civil lawsuits,6 7 a policy strongly supported by the Supreme
Court and the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement. ADR ar-
gues that formal dispute resolution is too expensive and too divisive a way
to resolve disputes. These arguments are most persuasive-if one agrees
with the Hobbesian Paradigm that adjudication is only the resolution of
private disputes. Fiss argues that the goal of adjudication is justice and not
mere efficiency, or even repose. Hence, private "settlement" is not an ap-
propriate way to end adjudication, especially for those cases where there
are significant distributional inequalities, where it is hard to get true con-
sent because the parties are social groups, where the court needs to super-
vise the parties after judgment, or where there is a social need for an
authoritative interpretation of law.6"
Like his public values thesis generally, Fiss' anti-settlement thesis
seems inapplicable to most lawsuits.6 9 Recent studies (included in the
Cover, Fiss and Resnik casebook) suggest that the "typical" lawsuit in our
modern procedural system still seems to be one where a few parties are
fighting over money, usually $10,000 or less, and counsel for each side is
prepared to spend perhaps thirty hours on the case. 71 Were nine out of
ten lawsuits like this to be settled, we should not be greatly disturbed. On
the other hand, Fiss' thesis seems valid for that not insubstantial number
of cases involving group or public rights. Adjudication of such cases ought
to be in the formal court system, and judges should not be so eager to
press the parties to settle their cases. Indeed, even when the parties come
before the judge with a stipulated settlement, the judge has a continuing
public duty to scrutinize the settlement to assure that it is not unjust.7 1
The authors themselves are divided over the cogency of Fiss' public val-
ues thesis,7 '2 but seem to agree that more is going on in many adjudica-
tions than just dispute resolution, and that the choices made by the
judge-especially those labeled procedural or jurisdictional choices-must
often be evaluated by standards of public justice, and not by private conve-
66. Fiss, Foundations of Adjudication, supra note 56, excerpted at pp. 220-24.
67. See pp. 588-612, 706-30, 1571-1620.
68. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (excerpted pp. 719-28).
69. See McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985).
70. Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA
L. REv. 72, 84 (1983) (excerpted pp. 198-209).
71. This is not unlike a judge's duty to scrutinize a plea bargain in a criminal case to determine
whether the defendant truly and freely consents to it, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, or a judge's duty to
scrutinize the settlement of a class action to assure its fairness to the class members, see FED. R. wIV.
P. 23(e), or the analogous duty to examine the settlement of a government antitrust lawsuit to deter-
mine whether the settlement is in the public interest.
72. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 43-44 (1983); pp. 729-30 (unpublished note by Cover responding to Fiss).
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nience or mere efficiency. That is, "public rights" are often involved in
adjudication. When that is the case, courts have an obligation to mold
procedural requirements to meet public needs.
Such a public rights thesis is a powerful instrument for criticizing cur-
rent procedural doctrine. Consider, for example, the law of standing, a
major theme of chapter three. In Gilmore v. Utah,'3 the Supreme Court
vacated its earlier stay of an execution of Gary Gilmore by the State of
Utah, on the ground that Gilmore had waived his rights to challenge the
death penalty. Gary Gilmore had, in fact, repeatedly expressed a desire to
face the execution. In upholding the penalty, though, the Court rejected
the petition of Bessie Gilmore, Gary's mother, to challenge the legality of
the Utah death penalty (about which there was substantial question)74 on
the ground that she had no "standing" to question the execution of some-
one else."5 Whatever questions conventional doctrine might pose regarding
the Court's action in this case,"7 the public rights thesis would object to
the Court's pretense of ducking the hard substantive issue (the constitu-
tionality of Utah's death sentence statute) by denying Bessie Gilmore-or
any other member of the public-standing. Indeed, the authors make a
point of including the contrapuntal Commonwealth v. McKenna,'7 where
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took up a similar challenge to the
Pennsylvania death penalty, raised by amici and not by the defendant,
because it felt a duty to "consider the interests of society as a whole in
seeing to it that justice is done, regardless of what might otherwise be
normal procedure."'" 8
Chapter three also takes up issues surrounding the assertion of group
rights by representatives. A key case is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueli'n,"9
in which the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule 23(c)(2) requires
actual notice to be given to all members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
who can be identified with a reasonable effort. The decision would be
uncontroversial, except that the notice requirement killed the class action.
The class consisted of over three million odd-lot securities customers, who
claimed that defendants violated the antitrust and securities laws by
monopolizing and overcharging for their services. Class members had av-
erage claims of about $70. Because there were so many members and be-
cause their individual stakes were so small, the notice requirement ren-
dered the class action unmanageable, and the Court directed that it be
dismissed. A central concern raised by the holding in Eisen is the Court's
73. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (excerpted pp. 432-36).
74. See id. at 1017-18 (White, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 1013-17 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 1017 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. See id. at 1017-19 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1019-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at
1020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174 (1978) (excerpted pp. 446-52).
78. Id. at 439, 383 A.2d at 180 (p. 449).
79. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (excerpted pp. 495-507).
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treatment of the class action as simply a congeries of individual lawsuits,
for which actual notice is the normal, constitutionally required practice.80
The Court, in other words, accepted the Hobbesian assumption that the
lawsuit involves discrete unconnected private rights, and from that as-
sumption concluded that rights can only be grouped together in a class
action when it would be more efficient to do so. Looking at the lawsuit
from the public rights perspective renders the Court's action more prob-
lematic. The three million customers, as well as future customers, have a
public right to defendants' compliance with statutory duties of fair deal-
ing. Because individual litigants had insufficient incentives to pursue their
rights, a class action aggregating their claims made sense. To eviscerate
the class action by strict application of a procedural rule is just as wrong
in Eisen as the Court's refusal to consider the third-party arguments was
in Gilmore.8
Obviously, the Cover, Fiss and Resnik thesis that procedural rules
should be tailored to protect public rights has broad application, beyond
the few examples mentioned here. Consider its application to issues in-
volving the ability of the government to sue to protect the disadvantaged,82
rules of subject-matter jurisdiction in complex cases,8" statute-based rules
which create barriers to adjudication for the poor,84 statute-based rules
providing counsel fees to encourage certain types of litigation,85 sanctions
against parties violating the discovery rules,86 and so on. For all of these
issues, beliefs about the role of adjudication are often critical in determin-
ing what rules should be applied, and how they should be applied. Cover,
Fiss and Resnik persuasively argue that present application of procedural
rules by the courts often rests on unarticulated, discredited Hobbesian as-
sumptions. Application of procedural rules would be quite different if
judges and others were persuaded of the public rights thesis, or Fiss' more
ambitious public" values thesis. I now turn to a more elaborate exploration
of that thesis.
80. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (excerpted pp.
479-86).
81. This assumes that enforcement by private lawsuit, in addition to government enforcement of
the securities and antitrust laws, is better than enforcement by the government alone.
82. See United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977) (excerpted and analyzed pp.
538-45); cf. Estelle v. Justice, 426 U.S. 925 (1976) (government as intervening party) (excerpted pp.
546-49).
83. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (excerpted and analyzed pp.
613-30).
84. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (excerpted and
analyzed pp. 650-58); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1970) (excerpted and analyzed pp.
636-44).
85. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (excerpted and analyzed pp. 691-706).
But see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (excerpted and analyzed pp. 706-19).
86. See In re Professional Hockey Anti-Trust Litig., 63 F.R.D. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd, 531
F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. National Hockey League v. Metopolitan Hockey Club,
Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam) (all three opinions excerpted pp. 896-922).
1989]
The Yale Law Journal
III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ADJUDICATION: FROM PROCEDURALISM
TO NORMATIVISM
The Cover, Fiss and Resnik casebook avoids explicit discussion of juris-
prudential issues,"' but the authors' public rights thesis, and Fiss' public
values thesis, cannot be appreciated without understanding the book's ju-
risprudential context. Again, the story commences in the fifties. In the
same period in which Field and Kaplan published their procedure
casebook, Professors Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler published the
first edition of The Federal Courts,88 and Professors Hart and Albert
Sacks were pulling together their magisterial materials on The Legal Pro-
cess."9 These works, particularly that of Hart and Sacks, made procedure
the central topic of legal thinking for a generation, and an understanding
of their intellectual agenda helps place Cover, Fiss and Resnik in the
"post-legal process" jurisprudence 0 to which they are contributing.9"
American legal thought faced a crisis in the 1940s. On the one hand,
the legal realists in the 1920s and 1930s had debunked arguments resting
upon "natural law," the theory that legal obligations must be accountable
to reason or moral imperative. 2 The realists uncoupled law (especially
judicial decisions) from any effort to discern metaphysical "truth. 9 3 Their
moral skepticism, coupled with their commitment to representative democ-
racy, led most of the realists to accept "positivism," the theory that law
should be obeyed because it is the command of the legitimate sovereign.
On the other hand, this almost casual postivism ran against the grain of
much traditional American jurisprudence and seemed hard to defend in
light of the events in Europe. If law were nothing but the commands of
87. For example, the authors include as an excerpt from William Simon's The Ideology of Advo-
cacy, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29 (pp. 632-33), only his simple description of the "ethics of advocacy," and
omit the impressive jurisprudential analysis by which Simon tears apart the "ideology of advocacy."
88. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953).
89. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
Law (tent. ed. 1958).
90. Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship & Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48
U. PITT. L. REv. 691 (1987).
91. For important analyses of legal process thought from a history-of-jurisprudence perspective,
see Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152 (1985); White, The Evolution
of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973);
see also Peller, "Neutral Principles" in the 1950s (fall 1988 draft).
92. I am using "natural law" in its broad sense, not that preferred by early natural law philoso-
phers (e.g., Aquinas), who necessarily linked it to "divine law" or even "the law of human nature."
Natural law is a term that since has been used to characterize approaches to legal reasoning that
appeal to "principles," see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRIN-
ciPLE (1985), or reasoned policies. See, e.g., Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 279 (1985).
93. My favorite debunker is Judge Learned Hand, who said apropos of procedural issues:
Now a law-suit is an undertaking designed to settle a dispute. . . . Let us at the outset disa-
buse ourselves of the notion that we are engaged in an impartial and disinterested inquiry into
objective truth. . . . Our results have no general significance whatever, we merely reach a
passing accommodation which may be altogether foreign to any permanent answer.
Address by Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of N.Y. (Nov. 17, 1921).
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the sovereign, were the Nazi decrees not "law"? This was a hard notion
to accept, and prominent jurisprudes in the 1940s argued for fresh interest
in the morality of law.9'
Hart and Sacks' legal process theory was a synthesis that satisfied these
antipodal jurisprudential desires by creating a proceduralist framework
whereby positivist commands would in the ordinary course be assuredly
just and reasonable. Thus, the legal process materials accepted the funda-
mental positivist premises that government is an essentially contractarian
enterprise reacting to the problems of private parties95 and that "a deci-
sion which is the duly arrived at result of a duly established procedure for
making decisions . . . 'ought' to be accepted as binding upon the whole
society. . ... 91 Yet Hart and Sacks also repeatedly affirmed the notion
that "[1]aw is a . . . purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the
basic problems of social living,"117 and stressed the duty of officials to en-
gage in "reasoned elaboration" to solve those problems., This owes much
to natural law.99 Recognizing that positivist commands might clash with
this natural law goal, Hart and Sacks urged the importance of procedural
safeguards. "A procedure which is soundly adapted to the type of power
to be exercised is conducive to well-informed and wise decisions. An un-
sound procedure invites ill-informed and unwise ones."1 00
Intimately related to proceduralism was Hart and Sacks' concept of ad-
judication, which similarly reveals both positivist and natural law ele-
ments. Hart and Sacks saw courts "as places of initial resort for solving
94. L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEs'r OF ITSELF (1940); Lucey, Natural Law and American
Legal Realism: Their Respective Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEo.
L.J. 493 (1942).
95. In classic Hobbesian fashion, chapter two of the Legal Process materials concerns "The Role
of Private Ordering and Some of Its Problems," a philosophical antecedent to the rest of the book on
government's role in solving controversies private parties could not resolve. In a like fashion, chapter
three concerns "The Courts as Places of Initial Resort for Solving Problems Which Fail of Private
Solution."
96. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 89, at 4-5.
97. Id. at 166. "It can be accepted as a fixed premise, therefore, that every statute and every
doctrine of unwritten law developed by the decisional process has some kind of purpose or objective,
however difficult it may be on occasion to ascertain it or to agree exactly how it should be phrased."
Id.
98. In resolving uncertainty through the exercise of discretion the official "must elaborate the
arrangement in a way which is consistent with other established applications of it. And he must do so
in the way which best serves the principles and policies it expresses. If the policy of the specific
arrangement is open to doubt, the official should interpret it in the way which best harmonizes with
more basic principles and policies of law." Id. at 165; see id. at 174-75 (general prohibition in Ameri-
can law against "arbitrariness").
99. The materials at various points reveal the influence of Professor Lon Fuller, a colleague of
Hart and Sacks at the Harvard Law School. Fuller believed that law had to be "purposive" (presum-
ably embodying a rational, humane purpose) and in that way accountable to human reason. Works
relied on by Hart and Sacks include L. FuLLER, THE LAw IN QuEsr OF ITSELF (1940); L. Fuller,
The Forms of Adjudication (draft circulated in the 1950s). Published the same year that Hart and
Sacks put out their tentative edition was the celebrated Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958), a leading statement of modern (nontheistic)
natural law.
100. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 89, at 173.
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problems which fail of private solution." '' Essential to adjudication is the
"authoritative determination by the deciding tribunal imposing a solution
upon the parties to a dispute" and the reasoned justification of that deci-
sion "by reference to impersonal criteria of decision applicable in the same
fashion in any similar case. ' '  Hart and Sacks recognized that adjudica-
tion is more than just dispute resolution, however. "Adjudication in its
normal operation is at once a process for settling disputes and a process
for making, or declaring, or settling law. Normally, also, law-settlement is
a by-product of dispute-settlement."' 0 3 Two huge chapters of the legal
process materials are dedicated to the exploration of rational judicial law-
making. On the other hand, Hart and Sacks favored only "interstitial"
lawmaking by judges and argued that judges are not institutionally com-
petent to make polycentric decisions affecting groups of people.'0 4
The legal process synthesis I have drawn from Hart and Sacks also
characterizes the 1953 edition of Field and Kaplan, albeit less explicitly.
Indeed, this synthesis provides an unstated working assumption for proce-
dure books (and especially casebooks) since the 1950s: The study of proce-
dure is central to understanding law, because rational procedures facilitate
the ability of positive law to be implemented in a way consistent with
reason and natural law. The Cover, Fiss and Resnik casebook is influ-
enced by the Hart and Sacks tradition, because it too emphasizes the im-
portance of rational procedures to achieving reasonable results. But Proce-
dure is a departure from earlier casebooks, especially Field and Kaplan.
Cover, Fiss and Resnik are jurisprudentially uncomfortable with Hart
and Sacks' concessions to positivism. The working assumption of the
Cover, Fiss and Resnik book is not proceduralism, the notion that good
procedures are presumptive evidence of good results, but is instead norma-
tivism, the notion that good results (substantive justice) are presumptive
evidence of good procedures.' 5
What troubles Cover, Fiss and Resnik about proceduralism is that its
emphasis on process threatens to sanction unjust results and to submerge
critical debate over substantive justice. A proceduralist mentality would be
101. Id. at 366 (chapter title).
102. Id. at 664-65.
103. Id. at 662.
104. Id. at 669:
Adjudication of disputes about managerial decisions involving the selection of a course of action
for the future from among many possible courses is not ordinarily satisfactory, if it is feasible
at all, because of the numerous variables to be taken into account and the impossibility of
developing generally applicable premises of reasoning with reference to which the variables
can be judged.
See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (circulated in draft
form in the fifties).
105. Professor Alex Aleinikoff suggested the term "normativism" to me in his comments on this
review. The generalization in text is, of course, never explicitly set forth in Procedure itself. I make
the generalization based upon my conversations with the authors, my experience in Fiss' procedure
class in 1975, and my reading of the casebook in light of the authors' earlier scholarship.
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sympathetic to the Court's denial of relief in both Gilmore and Eisen, for
example. In both cases, claimants were asking the Court to create special
rules, which the Court refused to do, in the name of procedural regularity.
Cover, Fiss and Resnik are hostile to this approach, to the extent that the
general procedural rule stands in the way of normatively correct results.
The gulf between the proceduralism of Hart and Sacks and the norma-
tivism of Cover, Fiss and Resnik is, to some extent, a generational gulf.
The morphogenesis of legal process theory came in the 1940s, with the
realist-natural law debate. The morphogenesis of post-legal-process theory
came in the 1960s, with the lessons of structural reform litigation. This
litigation grew out of Brown, which was itself a subtle challenge to legal
process ideals. Most legal process thinkers ignored Brown,0 6 or even criti-
cized it for its failure to find a text-based constitutional argument or a
"neutral principle" to justify its invalidation of state-sanctioned
segregation..07
Indeed, Brown is a shattering moment for legal process' insistence on
judicial neutrality. In a formal sense, the old separate-but-equal rule was
a "neutral" rule, because it treated whites and blacks "equally"-they
theoretically got the same schools, facilities, and so forth. But Brown
showed us that what is stated as neutral may in fact be heavily biased,
because of the social context. In a society where one race held the money
and the power and the reins of government, separate but equal was not a
very neutral policy, for it was obviously one mode by which existing white
elites subjugated black citizens, and pacified poor white citizens. The so-
cial context of Brown flips the entire legal process/positivist metaphor for
adjudication as the way by which our society avoids the "disintegrating
resort to violence."' 8 Apartheid itself was violence against blacks, both
symbolically and physically. Before Brown, white supremacists could and
did enforce segregation in the (state) courts, whose judgments were en-
forceable through the sheriff's office. Hence, in a very real sense, adjudi-
cation was part of positive law's violence against black citizens. This state-
sponsored violence was in no way ameliorated by its procedural regular-
ity, and Brown teaches that meticulous procedures cannot validate morally
squalid decisions.
The lessons of Brown-the legitimacy of public values as a source of
law, the ambiguity of neutrality, and the violence of proceduralism-have
become a battleground for the jurisprudential soul of legal process the-
ory.'09 Cover, Fiss and Resnik-and other academicians of the post-
106. It is noteworthy that in the several thousand pages of their materials, Hart and Sacks never
mention Brown (decided four years earlier). Even Fuller did not focus on Brown in his articles on
natural law and adjudication.
107. E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1959).
108. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 89, at 4.
109. Some conservative process theorists still deny the validity of Brown, and the sweep of its
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Brown Era-reject the legal process effort to "explain" Brown under
proceduralist assumptions. For them, Brown is the starting point, not the
permissible exception, and its central lesson is the normativity of law, the
ability of law to address issues of moral right and justice. The test of a
good legal rule is its normative correctness, not its procedural pedigree.
The Cover, Fiss and Resnik book is the first procedure text devoted to
the lessons of normativism. This is one reason the book starts with the due
process cases, in which justice values trump positive law and procedural
rules are argued in the context of socially progressive goals. Goldberg v.
Kelly itself is a good example of natural law reasoning, similar to Brown.
The same positive law that gave Mr. Kelly his welfare benefits also cir-
cumscribed those benefits with the procedures the Court invalidated. 1
The "is" was very clear, yet there was a strong sense of "ought" that led
the Court to invalidate New York's procedures. A positivist could defend
the Court's action if it had been based upon a dispositive, clear constitu-
tional text, or upon some neutral principle, but it was not. What the
Court considered "crucial" to the case was the "immediately desperate"
plight of the welfare recipient who may have been wrongfully terminated,
and the public values underlying our nation's welfare system."1 The three
dissenting Justices correctly recognized this as deeply inconsistent with
traditional legal process concepts of adjudication."'
There are other normativist features of Goldberg v. Kelly, relating to
the injustice of denying Mr. Kelly the benefits at all (assuming his factual
complaint was correct). If Mr. Kelly received his post-termination hear-
ing, and was still denied his benefits, we should want to know why. Was
there bias? Did he get his point of view across effectively? The more we
explore his case, the more unhappy we are with procedural solutions to
social problems. The law cannot pretend to be neutral by providing ho-
mogenized procedures that have a malignant social impact, and unjust re-
lessons. These writers have exhausted the term judicial activism and for the most part remain a
marginalized group. A far more popular strategy is to limit the jurisprudence of Brown to desegrega-
tion and "related" cases. This is not hard to do, for what moral proposition is more widely accepted
than the wrongness of apartheid? And from a positivist legal process perspective, legalized segregation
was particularly invidious because blacks were excluded from the political process and so could not be
said, in any meaningful sense, to have consented to the arrangement. See J. CHoPER, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
110. Indeed, the Court seemed to move toward this sort of reasoning, starting with Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), through Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality
opinion), and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). But that movement was halted in Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
111. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. The Court continued:
From [the system's] founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and
well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within
the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. . . . Welfare, by meeting the basic de-
mands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that
are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community.
Id. at 264-65 (footnote omitted).




suits simply cannot be legitimated by just procedures. Indeed, one way to
read the Court's opinion in Goldberg is as an assurance of minimally
decent support for the disadvantaged, many of whom are marginalized
because of economic structures for which the state is responsible.
Just as Brown cannot be cabined, neither can Goldberg, if one believes
it is correct. Cover, Fiss and Resnik provide many more examples of sup-
posedly neutral rules that are oppressive when viewed in social context,
particularly in their violence to the poor, and of procedural cases where
the real issues are those of substantive justice." 3 By constitutionalizing
procedure, opening up the inquiry to social context and issues of Right,
and debunking mere proceduralism, the authors invite the student of law
to consider natural law modes of reasoning. This move is significant peda-
gogically, and jurisprudentially, for it signals a departure from legal pro-
cess orthodoxy. But then the question is: Upon what criteria is this ex-
plicit normativism based? Where does it lead us? Two different
jurisprudential directions for it are suggested in the oeuvre of Cover, Fiss
and Resnik, all of whom draw upon the legacy of Brown. One direction is
a modified positivism, in which courts (creatures and promulgators of pos-
itive law) consider natural law arguments and conceptions of justice
shared by our interpretive community. A second direction would be one
more clearly in the natural law tradition, in which the critical battles for
substantive justice are fought outside of the government.
Fiss' proposition that "[a]djudication is the social process by which
judges give meaning to our public values"1"" sounds like natural law, but
Fiss has spilled much ink in the last decade defending this idea in legal
process and positivist terms.11 5 Similarly, Resnik sets forth in the argot of
legal process her faith that formal adjudication serves profoundly impor-
tant values.11 6 Fiss and Resnik owe a great deal to legal process positiv-
ism, because they have chosen to follow the Hart and Sacks lead in seek-
ing progressive law through the positive organs of government. In this, of
course, they can draw upon one lesson of Brown-the ability of courts, an
arm of the state, to enforce legal rights and Right and, indeed, to trans-
form society through formal adjudication.
This debt to legal process, however, does not mean that Fiss' public
values thesis is completely reconcilable with that school. The central legal
113. Particularly apt are the materials on the costs of adjudication, and how they fall with partic-
ular weight upon the poor. Pp. 634-784.
114. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 56, at 2.
115. Fiss, The Varieties of Positivism, 90 YALE L.J. 1007 (1981), distinguishes "ethical positiv-
ism," which simply describes the difference between what law "is" and what it "ought" to be and "in
no way favors the 'is'," from "cognitive positivism," which "does favor the 'is'." Fiss' own academic
agenda seems similar to the one he attributes to a reform-minded ethical positivist: "[W]e need [to]
assume, first, that the scholar aspires to make law more just, to close the gap between 'ought' and 'is,'
and second, that the scholar believes that the path of the law ... is amenable to reason." Id. at 1011.
116. E.g., Resnik, supra note 56, at 380-82, 424-31, 445 (criticizing excesses of judicial
management).
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process objection to Fiss' public values thesis, developed in the context of
institutional structural reform litigation, is that it is beyond the "compe-
tence" of the judiciary. This objection breaks down into three interrelated
arguments. First, in a positivist democracy the legislature is the primary
lawmaking institution, and courts should be confined to making intersti-
tial law. The broad lawmaking assumed by Fiss' public values thesis
would seems to violate our (constitutional) preference for democratically
accountable lawmaking. Second, by calling upon courts to articulate and
apply public values in complex situations, Fiss' thesis necessarily involves
courts in dealing with polycentric problems which they are not capable of
solving. Even when courts retain jurisdiction over the problem for a pe-
riod of time, it is difficult for judges to untangle the interconnected web of
variables implicated in such problems. Although Professor Abram Chayes
suggested a decade ago that courts would show unexpected skill in dealing
with polycentric problems, 17 the troubling mistakes and frustrations of
structural litigation have been well-documented." 8 Third, anything be-
yond interstitial lawmaking threatens us with judicial fiat, the imposition
of the personal preferences of unelected officials. "Public value" is a
spongy term,"' for one scholar's public value is another scholar's rent.' 20
By making judges the arbiters of public values, Fiss' system is open to
charges of judicial tyranny.
By and large, Fiss answers these positivistic objections on their own
terms, but recently he has moved toward more explicit natural law argu-
ments. Consider Fiss' responses to the three versions of the competence
argument. In response to the constitutional structure argument, Fiss posits
that courts must "be seen as a coordinate source of government power
with their own sphere of influence," and their own lawmaking power.
"The judicial role is limited by the existence of constitutional values, and
the function of courts is to give meaning to those values.' 2' Hence, Fiss
correctly suggests, positivism in no way requires a single sovereign voice
to issue law, and our constitutional tradition of shared lawmaking power
117. Chayes, supra note 55, at 1307-09.
118. Indeed, the Cover, Fiss and Resnik book is quite candid about the problems with polycentric
problem-solving in the Coney Island Litigation. Second thoughts by the special master (pp. 310-41)
and the judge (pp. 365-70), as well as independent observations by the authors (pp. 351-65), suggest
that the Coney Island Litigation was shackled by the perceived inability of the court to do anything
about housing policy and patterns and that integration at Mark Twain has not eliminated problems of
stereotypes and segregation.
119. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 56, at 1 ("The values that we find in our Constitu-
tion-liberty, equality, due process, freedom of speech, no establishment of religion, property, no im-
pairments of the obligation of contract, security of the person, no cruel and unusual punishment-are
ambiguous.").
120. Affirmative action is a good example of this phenomenon. See Eskridge, Politics without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275,
334-37 (1988).




among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches supports ample
constitutional lawmaking, and policy-bending, authority for courts. 2'
Fiss concedes that courts will make mistakes in structural litigation and
that courts are severely limited in their ability to solve polycentric
problems. But he responds to the instrumentalist critique by observing
that "two further factors must be introduced into the analysis: the value of
a successful performance, and the success rate of alternate institutions per-
forming comparable tasks."12
Somewhat ironically, Fiss' response to the personal preference critique
of his public values thesis has changed over time. In 1979, Fiss argued
that the judicial "office is structured by both ideological and institutional
factors that enable and perhaps even force the judge to be objective-not
to express his preferences or personal beliefs."' 2 4 Because judges must
make decisions and listen to a variety of perspectives, and assume respon-
sibility for their judgment with reasoned justifications, they are most likely
to have good reasons for decisions, reasons that transcend their personal
preferences." 5 More recently, Fiss has argued that an important con-
straint on judges is their participation in a professional "community of
interpretation," in which adjudication is an extended conversation by
judges with other jurists (including appellate judges), lawyers, legislators,
and scholars. 2 This is a fascinating move in the direction of natural law:
official state prescriptions are not the sole source of law, and the judge's
decision may not be "law" if rejected by the professional interpretive
community.
Fiss' reliance on a community of legal interpretation has brought him
nothing but trouble, however. Literary theorist Stanley Fish has claimed
that conventions of interpretation are not constraining because they can be
and are routinely manipulated. 27 Professor (now Dean) Paul Brest ex-
pressed a widely shared concern that such a narrowly defined community
of interpretation is itself problematic, because of its narrow class, racial,
and gender composition, not to mention its professional ties to the status
122. I have supported Fiss' response through a textual and historical analysis of the Constitution
in Eskridge, supra note 48, at 1498-1503. It is noteworthy that Fiss has not explicitly relied upon the
"republican" tradition which apparently influenced our Constitution and which is more ambivalent
about positivism. Compare Fiss, Forms ofJustice, supra note 56 and Fiss, Foundations of Adjudica-
tion, supra note 56, with M. SEIDMAN, G. STONE, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TuSHNEr, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1987); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); and Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988).
123. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 56, at 32; see also Eskridge, supra note 120, at 301-09.
124. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 56, at 12-13.
125. Id. at 13-14.
126. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Fiss, Conventionalism,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985); see S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASON-
ING 210-14 (1985).
127. Compare Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) with Fiss, Conventionalism,
supra note 126. See also Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation (With Sugges-
tions on How to Make Bouillabaisse), 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 863-73 (1985).
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quo."2" Nor do Fiss' co-authors offer him much comfort. Resnik is more
cautious in her claims for normativist adjudication, reflecting a pragmatic
ambivalence toward judicial power, and her awareness that power can be
either heroic or grotesque, depending on the holders and the circum-
stances.12 9 Cover, too, lacks Fiss' faith in the ability of judges to achieve
justice consistently and posits a strikingly different vision of law and
community.'"
Cover's disagreement with Fiss and his positive vision of law suggest a
more explicitly natural law direction for post-legal process thought. Cover
posits a normative universe of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful,
that is hardly exhausted by the statist "paraphernalia of social control" of
which judges are central figures.'' "The normative universe is held to-
gether by the force of interpretive commitments-some small and private,
others immense and public. These commitments-of officials and of
others-do determine what law means and what law shall be."'3 2 Hence,
for Cover the creation of law ("jurisgenesis") "takes place always through
an essentially cultural medium" of discussion, experience, sharing, and
disputing among members of the community. The state has no monopoly
on jurisgenesis, nor does any particular group in our society-indeed,
many insular groups create their own special law. Instead, the state is
more likely to destroy law (it is "jurispathic"), because its interest in so-
cial control impels it to choose certain legal interpretations and suppress
other interpretations.
Cover's world of thriving jurisgenerative communities of interpretation
is one of rich and amazing natural law. Its view of adjudication is a re-
nunciation of positivism, whether of the strong Hobbesian sort, or the lib-
eral positivism of Hart and Sacks, or even that of Fiss and Resnik. Like
Fiss and Resnik, Cover finds the dispute-resolution justification for courts
pedestrian and old-fashioned. But Cover's critique takes a striking twist,
for he claims that courts exist because our pluralistic society has too many
communities of interpretation-too much law. "Courts, at least the courts
of the state, are characteristically 'jurispathic,'" created "to suppress law,
to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon laws a hierarchy."'1 33
Like Fiss and Resnik, Cover believes in public values-he calls them no-
128. Compare Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765, 770-73 (1982) with
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, supra note 126.
129. See Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YAL.E L.J. 1727 (1987); Resnik, supra note 56.
130. Cover, supra note 72.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id. at 40; see id. at 53 ("Judges are people of violence. Because of the violence they com-
mand, judges characteristically do not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic office. Con-
fronted with the luxuriant growth of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and




mos. Unlike Fiss and Resnik, Cover believes that courts are not the cre-
ators of public values and, in fact, that they typically are the enemy.
Cover's view of the jurispathic nature of courts receives powerful sup-
port from the Cover, Fiss and Resnik book. While the book starts with
Goldberg v. Kelly, in which the Court aligned itself against the violence
of the state bureaucracy, the book's cases can be read to suggest that
Goldberg was an aberration. In case after case, the Court has retreated
from the natural law justice of Goldberg to the safe harbors of legal pro-
cess positivism: The state position is usually endorsed in essentially posi-
tivist legal process terms."" Shockingly typical of the retreat is the Court's
decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services."'3 Abby Gail
Lassiter was the mother of five children. In 1976, she was convicted of
second-degree murder and sentenced to prison. The Durham County,
North Carolina Department of Social Services two years later petitioned
the state court for termination of Ms. Lassiter's parental rights to her
fourth child, William. Ms. Lassiter was unable to obtain an attorney from
her prison cell, and at her termination hearing she represented herself.
Very badly. Ms. Lassiter engaged in rambling and irrelevant arguments,
failed to see hearsay problems with the testimony elicited by the state, and
thoroughly antagonized the presiding judge.13 The state was successful in
terminating her parental rights to William.
The issue before the Court was whether or not Ms. Lassiter could lose
her parental rights without being provided with counsel by the state, as is
required in criminal cases before a prison sentence can be imposed. The
Court held that no counsel was necessary. The Court engaged in a utilita-
rian balancing test to determine whether the "costs" of providing counsel
in these cases would exceed the "benefits."13 Although the Court found
the balance to favor provision of counsel, it started with a presumption
134. The Burger Court's retreat from Goldberg procedural due process is a central theme of
chapter one (pp. 112-79). See supra note 2. The central case study in chapter two-the Coney Island
Desegregation Litigation-might not have been possible after the Court's decision in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which the authors duly note (pp. 350-51). Chapter three on parties and
participation focuses on the Court's backward turn on issues of standing, see Gilmore v. Utah, 429
U.S. 1012 (1976) (pp. 429-53); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (pp. 454-68), and
representation, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (pp. 495-509); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (pp. 509-13). Even the recent cases that open up the
process do so begrudgingly, see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1976) (pp. 570-81), and without
any commitment. Chapter four on strategic interaction assembles a broad range of the Court's recent
decisions which are insensitive to the poor's inability to obtain effective access to the legal system. See
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (pp. 733-50); Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survi-
vors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (pp. 650-58); Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (pp. 706-19); Morris
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (pp. 768-79). Chapter seven on anti-procedure includes several of the
Court's decisions making it more likely that unsophisticated persons will waive their rights of access.
See Kramer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (pp. 1588-1600); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977) (pp. 1601-17); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (pp. 1573-80).
135. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
136. See, e.g., id. at 55 n.24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting the judge: "I wish you [Ms.
Lassiter] wouldn't talk like that it scares me to be in the same room with you.").
137. Id. at 27-33 (opinion of the Court).
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against providing counsel when a physical liberty interest is not involved
and found the balance insufficient to offset that presumption. Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion used the balancing test to argue against
creating the initial presumption and for counsel in all cases.13 8 A second
dissent, by Justice Stevens, argued that deprivation of parental rights is
similar to deprivation of physical liberty and, thus, that a cost-benefit bal-
ance is irrelevant and counsel must be provided in all cases.139
Lassiter epitomizes the conservative, anti-normativist nature of legal
process decisions. The Court admitted that "[iunformed opinion" and jus-
tice require counsel for an indigent woman seeking to retain ties to her
child, yet fell back on the tired positivist distinction between the Right and
the law.'" The Court's balancing process was blatantly statist: The Court
created a new presumption to avoid protecting a liberty interest that seems
no different from physical liberty, and proceeded to balance away Ms.
Lassiter's dignity as well as her rights. Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion suggests a parallel between the Court's and the trial judge's vic-
timization of Ms. Lassiter.' 4 1 Yet even his eloquent opinion is in some
ways unprogressive, for it objectifies and balances the human relationship,
treating the parent-child bond like a commodity. Only Justice Stevens'
dissent recognized the horror of the Justices' utilitarian analysis and its
result.
Cover, Fiss and Resnik would all recognize Lassiter as horrifying. Fiss
seems to expect judges to do better, but the evidence is that Lassiter is the
norm and Goldberg the aberration." 2 Cover's insight is that however
wonderful the Warren Court might have been, jurisgenesis must regard
the judiciary with suspicion. If courts are-as Fiss is fond of say-
ing-coordinate branches of the state, how can we expect courts to stand
in opposition to the state on a regular basis? Fiss' answer, I gather, is that
the post-New Deal state is a potentially powerful affirmative force for
social justice.""3 This seems sound as a theoretical matter, but is not al-
ways borne out in practice. Government as an affirmative force has been
diluted by the recent trend of appointments to courts and agencies. While
Fiss may hold out hope for a reversal of this trend, others are skeptical.
Cover's skepticism about statism is an idea whose time has come, and it
will surely have a profound effect on post-legal process thought, pushing
it in anti-positivist directions. 4 The lesson Cover draws from Brown is
138. Id. at 35, 38-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 33-34 (opinion of the Court).
141. Id. at 57-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. See the cases assembled supra notes 2 & 134.
143. See Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987).
144. For discussions of the natural law movement in the new legal process, see Aleinikoff, Updat-
ing Statutory Interpretation, 87 MicH. L. REv. 70 (1988); Eskridge, The Jurisprudence of Statutory
Interpretation (draft Jan. 1989) (on file with author); Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitu-
tional Theory, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1502 (1985).
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not the centrality of courts, but instead the centrality of "redemptive con-
stitutionalism."" What eliminated state-sanctioned segregation was not
the Supreme Court, but an ongoing interpretive community (or perhaps
several communities) of parents, civic activists, ministers, lawyers, aca-
demics, lobbyists, and journalists, who associated formally and informally
to transform themselves and to transform the social and political world
that was (and to a great extent remains) morally wrong. To be sure, state
actors-judges, legislators, Department of Justice lawyers (including
Fiss)-were important participants, but the central participants were the
people whose sense of moral outrage led them to violate the positive law
by sitting in at segregated lunch counters, to march with Dr. King against
the commands of municipal ordinances and state judicial decrees, to
demonstrate with the Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee, and
to serve jail time for nonviolent but disruptive activity (as Cover did). The
legal victories were important, but not as important as the creative disrup-
tion of racist rules of social control, the community's implementation of
remedial plans, and the private discussions and cooperation that actually
accomplished social progress, inch by painful inch.
The larger interpretive and implementive communities spawned by the
civil rights movement are one model for the post-legal process reconstruc-
tion of American jurisprudence and law. 46 This is a model that owes
much to the Cover, Fiss and Resnik casebook. Like traditional theory,
normativism emphasizes the importance of structuring institutional ar-
rangements and procedural rules to facilitate just results. Unlike tradi-
tional theory, normativism is pessimistic that just results will necessarily
flow from good procedures, and understands that justice involves a
broader social transformation, perhaps of the sort where state activity is
not appropriate (Cover) or sufficient (Fiss and Resnik).
CONCLUSION
Bob Cover died in 1986. His collaboration with Owen Fiss and Judi
Resnik on Procedure will be a significant part of his intellectual legacy.
The qualities that I find prominent in the book are qualities that charac-
terized his work and his life: commitment to intellectual inquiry and can-
dor, even when they lead in unpleasantly surprising directions; the cen-
trality of justice, as a way to think about our common humanity; and a
skepticism about the shrouds of positivism, such as procedure, neutral
principles, the idea of the state as all that stands between us and disori-
enting violence.
The most pervasive quality in the book, however, is its intense intellec-
145. The term is from Cover, supra note 72, at 33.
146. See McDougall, Interpretation, Implementation and the Search for Community (draft sum-
mer 1988) (on file with author).
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tual debate and aspiration. The debate among Cover, the natural law an-
archist; Fiss, the Great Society statist; and Resnik, the feminist progres-
sive, is a central debate for the post-legal process era. There is a charming
passage about halfway through the book that brings a fragment of the
debate to our attention quite explicitly. Fiss suggests that Cover's nomos is
a misplaced romantic longing for a more peaceful existence, a world with-
out social strife and painful inequality. 47 Cover responds that, in his faith
in courts to do justice, "it is Fiss not Cover who is the romantic here,"
since the Court's natural law activism in support of racial justice "was
temporary and accidental; that it is already changing and will soon be a
romantic memory of the sublime sixties.) 148
The truth is that Fiss and Cover and (to some extent) Resnik are all
romantics. The book they have produced is nothing if not a romantic view
of how procedure might be taught to first-year students, why adjudication
might be seen as something more than private dispute resolution, and
what law might be if we commit ourselves to understanding its human
complexity and frequent oppressiveness. A romantic vision of pedagogy,
scholarship, and law itself can be dismissed as unrealistic, mushy, and
impractical. Or it can be a source of inspiration and interconnection as
something to which we aspire but might never reach.
The best legacy of a romantic is the vivid image, the inspirational idea,
the creative argument. In his collaboration with Owen and Judi, Bob
Cover has blessed us with such a legacy.
147. P. 729 (citing and quoting Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985)).
148. P. 730 (quoting an unpublished note written by Cover and discovered after his death).
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